Abstract: Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been part of the United States regulatory process for more than thirty years. This paper examines how the academic debate over the use of CBA has evolved while at the same time its place in the regulatory process has become increasingly firm. The debate over CBA has moved from a clear dichotomy between supporters of regulation who opposed CBA, and opponents of regulation who supported CBA, to a more nuanced discussion of how CBA can be improved. While this change has clear benefits for the use of CBA and for the quality of regulations, we should not forget that some of the earlier criticisms of CBA focused on the way it was implemented. By coupling CBA with presidential review, CBA often takes a backseat to political concerns. The continued relevance of these criticisms may mean that the next stage in the evolution of the use of CBA may turn to its institutional setting.
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The possibility of bias in regulatory analysis threatens its viability as a decision making tool. (McGarity 1987) It is time for progressive groups as well as ordinary citizens to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. (Revesz and Livermore 2008) The use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in United States regulatory policy is approaching its fourth decade. Over the past thirty years, CBA has been at the center of intense controversy. Supporters of regulation have blamed CBA for deregulation and for playing an important role in reducing environmental protections and American health and safety. Opponents of regulation have regularly called for greater use of CBA, citing the immense cost that regulation imposes upon American business.
Through all of this fiery rhetoric however, something remarkable is emerging.
Cost-benefit analysis is now firmly entrenched in the regulatory process and few predict that this will change in the decades ahead. Agencies that once fought having to conduct analyses now do so regularly. And the academic community, particularly legal scholars, has begun to focus on improving cost-benefit analysis rather than removing it from the regulatory process.
While CBA still has its strident opponents, they are becoming increasingly marginalized in the debate over its use. Now the focus on CBA primarily concerns how to incorporate distributional concerns and insights from behavioral economics into its use. Supporters of regulation are now weighing in on these debates rather than merely arguing that CBA is inherently biased against regulation.
How did we get here and what does this evolution mean for the future of costbenefit analysis? This paper traces the evolution of cost-benefit analysis in the United The paper proceeds as follows. Section II covers the rancorous debate over cost-benefit analysis after it was adopted by Ronald Reagan in 1981. It also chronicles the Clinton Administration"s acceptance of CBA and pro-regulation advocates" reaction --an increased stridency in the calls for the CBA"s elimination.
Section III covers the evolution of a pro-regulation, pro-cost-benefit-analysis argument and its eventual ascendance. Finally, Section IV takes stock of where costbenefit analysis stands at the onset of the Obama Administration and how it is likely to evolve as its role in the regulatory process approaches middle age.
II The Early History of Cost-Benefit Analysis
While the implementation of CBA is generally associated with the Reagan Administration and Executive Order (E.O.) 12291, it has its genesis in the three presidencies of the 1970s. President Nixon implemented "Quality of Life Reviews," requiring that before agencies adopt regulations, they consider alternatives. President Ford required agencies to produce "Inflation Impact Statements" in limited circumstances. Finally, requirements most closely resembling CBA were instituted under President Carter (Weidenbaum 1997 Demuth and Ginsburg (1986) argued that analysis and executive regulatory review were complementary because they both encouraged accountability and a broad, balanced view of regulatory decisions. The academic defenses of CBA were not nearly as numerous as the critiques, which began to emerge in the 1980s and fully flowered in the 1990s. Many of the critiques were institutional in nature, criticizing OIRA for a lack of transparency and for killing regulations by taking years to review them (Friedman 1995 Finally, there were arguments made that CBA delayed the regulatory process.
In a 1992 article, McGarity coined the term, 'ossification of the rule-making process.'
Referring to stringent judicial review of agency regulations and the preponderance of analytical requirements imposed upon agencies that engage in rulemaking, McGarity contended that the rulemaking process had become so protracted and burdensome that agencies were avoiding rulemaking altogether. Mashaw and Harfst (1990) The institutional criticisms of OIRA had the largest and most immediate practical impact. In a letter to Congress, OIRA Administrator Wendy Gramm (1986) pledged to increase the transparency at OIRA and to ensure timely reviews of regulations. These changes were cemented in Executive Order under President Clinton in 1993. While the institutional critique would continue to surface occasionally (Bressman and Vandenbergh 2006) over the ensuing two decades, much of the legal and academic literature on OIRA review focused on cost-benefit analysis and the specific criticisms listed above.
The criticisms of CBA intensified after Bill Clinton became President.
Clinton, contrary to the expectation of supporters of regulation, retained cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory process (Revesz and Livermore 2008) . Clinton issued Executive Order 12866 5 to govern regulatory review. The new E.O. changed some of the language from the Reagan Executive Order (requiring that benefits of a regulation justify the regulation"s cost rather than the formulation in the Reagan E.O., which required that benefits exceed the costs) and added "reduction of discrimination or bias" as one of the benefits to be considered as part of a regulatory analysis.
As Friedman (1995) writing early in the Clinton era noted, 'Clinton, a moderate Democrat, may institutionalize regulatory reform far more effectively than the antiregulation Reagan, a conservative Republican.' This institutionalization occurred without the support of the pro-regulation community (Revesz and Livermore 2008) . However, with the institutional arguments against OIRA weakening because of efforts to make it more transparent and its reviews more timely, and presidential oversight of agency rulemaking becoming generally accepted, 6 supporters of regulation trained their fire on the probity of cost-benefit analysis.
The anti-CBA literature that developed during this period focused on the analytical legitimacy of cost-benefit analysis. Criticisms of particular aspects of CBA --such as the discounting of future values, the treatment of uncertainty, and the techniques for calculating the values of risk reduction (commonly expressed as the 'value of a statistical life (VSL)') 7 --were merged together to argue that CBA should play no role in the regulatory process (see e.g. Heinzerling 1997 Heinzerling , 1999 Heinzerling , and 2000 . Dreisen (2006) argued that these aspects inevitably biased CBA against regulation.
While supporters of regulation focused on arguing for the elimination of costbenefit analysis, supporters of CBA worked on suggesting improvements. Elliott (1994) argued that analysis did improve rules and noted that 80% of issues raised by OMB had not been considered by EPA. 8 This showed, according to Elliott, that OMB (and by extension cost-benefit analysis) could add value, but that the issues were often raised too late in the regulatory process to make a difference. Hahn (2005) argued that CBA was imperfectly applied by federal agencies and OIRA and produced numerous suggestions for strengthening its role in the regulatory process.
One academic 9 exception to the dichotomy between pro-regulation and antiregulation voices on cost-benefit analysis was Cass Sunstein. Sunstein, a law on-screen and benefits off-screen," "health-health tradeoffs," emotions and alarmist bias, and "separate evaluation and incoherence." He shows how these biases lead to consumer demand for regulations that at best will not improve their welfare and at worst may actually harm it. 'Cost-benefit analysis is best taken as a pragmatic instrument, agnostic on the deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex judgments where multiple goods are involved.' (Sunstein 2001a ). This argument was echoed by Adler and Posner (2001) in an essay arguing that costbenefit analysis corrects for 'distorted preferences' or preferences that do not enhance the individual's welfare. Adler and Posner specifically call for agencies ignore or discount such distorted preferences.
In another article, Sunstein (2001b) argues:
The best defense of CBA relies not on controversial claims from neo-classical economics but on a simple appreciation of how we all make mistakes in thinking about risks. . . Properly understood CBA should help us save lives, not only money. . .
What is most important here is to see that the case for cost-benefit analysis does not rest only or even mostly on economic grounds and that people of widely divergent views can support a suitably specified form of CBA. The emerging questions involve not whether to do CBA, but how; it is to those questions that we should now be turning.
Sunstein (2002) also argued for CBA as a pro-democratic reform that enhanced the transparency of agency decisionmaking.
There are democratic advantages as well. . . interest groups often manipulate policy in their preferred directions, sometimes by exaggerating risks, sometimes by minimizing them, sometimes by utilizing heuristics and biases strategically so as to mobilize public sentiment in their preferred directions. An effort to produce a fair accounting of actual dangers should help to diminish the danger of interest group manipulation.
This transparency argument had been made occasionally in the past by advocates of cost-benefit analysis (Arrow et. al. 1996) , but it had never been made by a supporter incomes, a change in CBA to incorporate distributional equity would go a long way to answering these critics.
While the academic debate was slowly evolving, the 'facts on the ground' were changing more rapidly. Agencies throughout the federal government were conducting cost-benefit analyses of their regulations and the techniques they were using were rapidly becoming more sophisticated. EPA alone spent millions of dollars on CBAs (Adler and Posner 1999) and created its own guidelines for analysis (Revesz and Livermore 2008) .
Outside of the United States, cost-benefit analysis has had a growing role in the regulatory process emerging in the European Union. Weiner (2006) writes, Europe and America now appear to be converging on the analytic basis for regulation.
In a process of hybridization, European institutions are borrowing 'Better Regulation' reforms from both the US approach to regulatory review using benefit-cost analysis and from European member states' initiatives on administrative costs and simplification; in turn the European Commission is helping to spread these reforms among the member states.
This movement of CBA to Europe is a further indication of the growing breadth of support for it and its likely permanence in the Untied States.
The European Union formally began impact assessments in 2002. European
Commission directorates conduct impact assessments. Starting in 2006, these assessments were reviewed by an Impact Assessment Board in the office of the Secretariat General. This system means that legislation (in addition to administrative action) in the E.U. is subject to impact assessment (Wiener and Alemanno (2010) Revesz and Livermore argued that by adopting a strict anti-CBA position, proregulation forces had allowed opponents of regulation to paint them as anti-rational.
They go on to explain, 'Yet cost-benefit analysis is only inherently antiregulatory if proregulatory groups are gulled into passivity by that belief. Proregulatory groups must shake off their torpor. Their opposition to cost-benefit analysis, even if it was understandable at the outset [,] has become very counterproductive. ' Revesz and Livermore argued that there are many ways to reform cost-benefit analysis to ensure that it leads to fairer (pro-regulation) outcomes and urged liberals to make these arguments.
The second work was in many ways even more groundbreaking. Lisa
Heinzerling, who had been a leader of the critics of cost-benefit analysis, cooperated with two economists and supporters of cost benefit analysis, Winston Harrington and Richard Morgenstern, to edit the volume, 'Reforming Regulatory Impact Analysis.'
The introductory chapter acknowledges the seeming permanence of cost-benefit analysis on the regulatory landscape. After a series of case studies, Heinzerling and her two co-authors offer a number of recommendations. These recommendations overlap considerably with the recommendations of Revesz and Livermore and more importantly (since he is the new administrator of OIRA) with those that Sunstein had made in various works.
economic definitions of CBA (Hahn and Litan 2005) and therefore the impact assessments in Europe will likely resemble the regulatory analyses in the U.S. The report carefully catalogs the ways in which behavior systematically deviates fromrationality and calls for reforms in regulation to account for these deviations.
Such reforms include an emphasis on disclosure as a regulatory tool, the use of default rules and simplification, making costs of social harms more salient, and influencing social norms. What does this mean for the future of cost-benefit analysis and for the future of the regulatory process? For the early proponents of CBA who had hoped that CBA would lead to deregulatory outcomes, the permanent ascendance of CBA is hardly an unmitigated victory. In order to ensure that CBA stayed in the regulatory process, both the technique and its application required and will continue to require modification. Part of this modification occurred when President Clinton changed the requirement that regulations have benefits that 'exceed' their costs to a requirement that benefit 'justify' their costs.
The recent work by Revesz and Livermore (2008) and by Harrington, et. al. (2008) signal the other adaptations that we are likely to see in the application of CBA.
Among these suggestions are the listing of benefits and costs in a non-monetized manner, greater and more transparent consideration of alternative policy options (Harrington et. al. 2008) , greater accounting of ancillary benefits, decreased use of intergenerational discounting (Revesz and Livermore 2008) , and analyses of deregulatory options with the same rigor as regulatory ones (both). All of these changes will lead to analyses that are at least as likely to favor regulation than deregulation, and few of them (if any) would be opposed by economists.
The result predicted by Revesz and Livermore, which I find entirely reasonable, will be a CBA that is used to argue for regulation as often as it is used to argue against it. An interesting question is whether CBA will lose some of its original supporters once it is seen as a tool that can be used to defend regulation as easily as attack it. In any case, the policy battles over cost-benefit analysis in the next decade are likely to be fights over techniques and specifics rather than over the merit of CBA If there is general agreement regarding the worthiness of CBA, focus may turn to this issue of whether CBA can achieve its potential in its current institutional structure or whether as constructed, it is inevitable that CBA will be intertwined with and subverted by politics. Some have argued that only if responsibility for conducting and/or overseeing regulatory analysis is removed from the executive branch, which also has responsibility for issuing regulations, will analysis play a role in guiding regulatory decisions. This argument leads naturally to calls for a Congressional office akin to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to play a role in supervising the conduct of CBA (Niskanen 2003 implemented the Impact Assessment Board described above. These developments will force the EU to grapple with many of the same institutional issues described here. Radaelli and Meuwese (2010) argue that these developments have already had the effect of strengthening the Secretariat General.
The second issue that supporters of cost-benefit analysis have failed to address is the length of time it adds to the rulemaking process. As mentioned above, this was first raised by McGarity (1992) and Mashaw and Harfst (1990 (Crews 2007) . Finally, Yackee and Yackee (2010) use the Unified Agenda 17 to examine the factors that affect the time between proposal and finalization of a regulation. They find that rules that are subject to procedural controls, such as cost-benefit analysis, are actually promulgated faster. This implies that the costs of CBA are low.
By contrast, the benefits of CBA, especially if reformed in the ways hoped for by pro-regulation advocates, are likely to be significant. CBA is designed to increase the net benefits of regulation and if it is correctly and faithfully implemented, it is certainly likely that it will do so in at least some circumstances. This would lead to CBA having potentially large benefits, making any small delays in the promulgation of rules worthwhile.
In the early years of the George W. Bush administration, Sunstein described regulatory policymaking as evolving from '1970s environmentalism' to 'the costbenefit state" (Sunstein 2002b ). This conclusion was likely premature. Cost-benefit analysis was still the subject of considerable controversy at that point. Now however, with Sunstein's own ascension as 'regulatory czar' and the publication of works from liberals suggesting reform of cost-benefit analysis rather than repeal, the cost-benefit state may actually be upon us.
Economists inside and outside the government are enhancing the techniques used for CBA. Cost-benefit analysis is being exported to the EU and to the Revesz and Livermore (2008) and Harrington et. al. (2009) are adopted this support will only increase.
At this point, the primary remaining concern will be whether CBA as implemented can actually achieve the goals voiced for it by those on both sides of regulatory debate. Examination of CBA will turn to its institutional setting within the regulatory process. Questions about the independence of those conducting the analyses will dominate the debate and the resolution of these questions may result in institutional structures that further cement cost-benefit analysis as part of the regulatory process.
